Economic growth in Africa has long been disappointing. We document that the financial sectors of most African countries remain significantly underdeveloped by the standards of other developing countries. We examine the factors that are associated with financial development in Africa and compare them with those in other developing countries. Population density appears to be considerably more important for banking sector development in Africa than elsewhere.
I. Introduction
Africa's growth performance has long been disappointing and it has been described as a tragedy by some commentators (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997) . Although less welldocumented and perhaps not surprising, the financial sectors of most African countries remain woefully under-developed, even relative to the standards of developing countries. This is despite the fact that most African countries have undergone extensive financial sector reforms in the last two decades of the same proportions as other developing and emerging countries. The reform packages included price and interest rate liberalization, removal of credit ceilings, introduction of a variety of measures for banking and capital market development, including financial regulatory schemes, and large scale privatizations of state-owned enterprises. These reforms led to the establishment of over twenty stock exchanges in a relatively short span of time. Unfortunately, except for South Africa, these stock markets remain illiquid, thin, and malfunctioning even by the standards of other developing countries.
The failure of the economic and financial sector reforms in Africa is visible in the data.
In 2007, the liquid liabilities of African financial sectors averaged slightly below 30 percent of GDP. In no other region of the developing world did that figure stand below 40 percent. In East Asia, Latin America, South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, it approached or exceeded fifty percent of GDP in 2007 (Table 1 ). The credit side of the picture looks even worse. Africa's average level of credit extended to the private sector represented only 16.6 percent of GDP in 2007 compared with ratios ranging from 32.5 to 43.9 percent for other developing regions (Table   2 ). Likewise, the stock market development indicators, as measured by market capitalization and trading activity (liquidity), relative to GDP, remain low for Africa, relative to the rest of the world (see Table 3 ).
The financial development indicators of Africa have improved in the period 1995-2005, but at a much slower pace than in other developing and emerging countries in Asia and Latin America. Although the African liquid liabilities ratio grew from 24 percent in 1995 to 31 percent in 2005, the growth for all regions other than East Asia eclipsed that of Africa (Table 1) .
The typical African country experienced only a 3 percentage point increase in this ratio from 1995 to 2005. Similarly, the extension of private credit to GDP grew from 12.1% to 15.5% over the period while that of all other developing regions, with the exception of East Asia and Latin America, increased more substantially (Figure 2 ).
To put Africa's lack of financial development in better perspective, consider the population-weighted trends for developing regions in GDP, liquid liabilities, and private credit since 1960 (Figure 3 , Panels A-C). Though the patterns differ across regions -for example, Latin America and the transition countries of Europe and Central Asia started with relatively high income levels, and thus their financial markets and institutions were in some sense catching up -the rest of the developing world has seen substantial improvement in financial indicators relative to Africa. Moreover, countries that started with similar or lower income levels in the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia have seen substantial improvement in both financial development and income. Africa has seen very little improvement on either dimension.
These disappointing results pose a puzzle as to what went wrong with the financial reforms in Africa. This is a crucial issue because the available evidence provides a convincing linkage between financial development and economic development (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine 2005; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000; Levine and Zervos 1998; and Rajan and Zingales 1998) . A well-functioning financial system fosters economic growth through its functions for capital mobilization, liquidity provision, price discovery, improvement in governance, and so forth. In particular, more liquid financial systems, including stock markets, experience faster rates of capital accumulation and subsequently greater productivity gains (e.g. Levine 1997, Levine and Zervos, 1998) . In the context of Africa where poverty is so widespread, the positive relationship between financial development and economic development is suggestive of a positive linkage between finance and poverty alleviation.
The state of African financial development raises a number of important questions. Is African financial development slow in itself, or is it merely a reflection of broader economic and policy failures? Are the levels of financial development achieved outside of Africa, in both developed and developing countries, achievable for most African countries? What factors have inhibited African financial development to this point? Finally, if those factors were corrected and financial development did take hold, would the finance-growth nexus hold in Africa as seen in other places?
There is virtually no academic research that addresses these questions. This paper represents a first step in addressing key issues at the heart of African financial development. Our aim is to assess whether African financial development is slower than it ought to be, and if so why. To do this, we first analyze the determinants of financial development in other developing countries via regression models based on prior research. We then use the regression coefficients to generate predicted levels of financial development, as measured by the ratios of liquid liabilities and private credit over GDP, for African countries. We then compare those predicted levels with the actual levels of financial development in the African countries. We find that the majority of African countries have lower levels of financial development, some with significantly lower levels, than would be predicted based on their fundamentals.
We then examine whether the factors that drive financial development in Africa are the same as in other developing countries. Concerning the indicators of banking sector development -that is liquid liabilities and private credit -we find that factors such as population density are more important in Africa than in other developing countries, while macroeconomic stability and broad measures of institutional quality are less important. Concerning the indicators of stock market development, such as market capitalization and turnover, we find instead that none of the factors that are significantly associated with stock market development in the rest of the world are significant in Africa. In large part, this is because most African stock markets remain thin, illiquid and dysfunctional; and only very recently have Sub-Saharan African countries made a policy commitment to their development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, methodology for benchmarking financial development across countries, and the summary statistics. Section 3 provides the main empirical results. First, it presents basic regression results for the determinants of banking sector development across countries. Second, it uses the results from the benchmarking models to construct predicted levels of banking sector development for African countries, which we then compare with their actual levels. Section 4 examines whether the variables associated with banking development in other developing countries from our base models are related in a similar way to African banking development. In this section, we also present our results on stock market development for Africa and the rest of the developing world, and perform robustness checks. We use additional proxies (transportation infrastructure, degree of urbanization, and the prevalence of bank branches) to delve more deeply into the reasons why population density appears to be so important for African banking development. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
II. Benchmarking Financial Development: Data and Methodology
The stylized facts on indicators, such as those in Tables 1 and 2, permit comparisons across countries in terms of their levels of financial development. Such comparisons can be revealing, especially when looking at a set of peers that are at a similar level of economic development. Yet, the selection of such peer groups is somewhat ad hoc and limits the degree to which a country can be compared to a broader set of countries. Moreover, comparing levels of financial development yields little insight into the factors (endowments, institutions, and policies) that led to those outcomes. For that, the literature has turned increasingly to regression analysis relying on some of the same variables that have been used to study the links between financial development and growth (Levine, 2005) .
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There is, however, no consensus about the factors that should be taken into account in explaining financial development, nor what indicators of that development are most reliable. We ground our analysis on the recent attempt by Beck et al. (2008) to standardize the selection of financial development indicators and explanatory variables for our benchmarking. Under this approach, the potential financial development indicators are ranked on the basis of the following criteria: (a) the directness of their linkages to welfare, (b) the goodness of fit of regressions that explain variation in them, (c) their coverage in terms of countries and years, and (d) the degree to which an indicator is stable within a country from year to year, but varies substantially across countries. 2 1 As in other recent papers, we use these variables, including growth, to describe financial development (Cull and Effron, 2008; Cull, Senbet, and Sorge, 2005) . By contrast, in the finance and growth literature, the financial indicators are among the explanatory variables used to explain growth. 2 Beck et al. (2008) call this the ratio of within sample variance to between sample variance. They worry that high within-country variation may reflect measurement errors or a high degree of co-movement with the business cycle. They argue that indicators of financial development are (or at least should be) better suited to measuring longer-term differences across countries rather than fluctuations along the cycle for a given country.
In most of our analysis we use the two standard indicators presented in Tables 1 and 2, namely the ratio of liquid liabilities in the banking system to GDP and the ratio of credit to private sector to GDP. The reason is that both measures score among the highest based on the all four criteria listed above. They score especially high relative to others on the first criterion, because they have been shown to be robustly associated with long-run economic growth (Levine 2005; Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000) .
3 Moreover, our analysis is rooted in banking indicators because banks hold the vast majority of financial sector assets in Africa and other developing countries.
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As already mentioned, Tables 1 and 2 show that Africa has low levels of financial development relative to other regions of the world in terms of these two indicators, However, this broad comparison does not provide a sufficient understanding of the determinants of this outcome. In order to understand this better, we benchmark African financial development relative to a set of variables that have been robustly associated with financial development in countries outside of Africa, especially in low and middle income countries.
To build the relevant variables, we rely upon prior studies, in particular those on the finance-growth nexus (e.g., Levine, 2005) and on government policies that promote financial development (e.g., Beck, et al, 2008) . To measure the extent to which countries have pursued policies that promote financial development, Beck et al. (2008) regress their indicators of financial development on a set of variables that describe the environment in which such development takes place, but that are exogenous to that process such as population size and 3 For descriptions of standard indicators of financial development and their use see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000) . 4 The ratio of private credit to GDP can, however, include lending by nonbank financial institutions. As Table 4 shows, though, the correlations between private credit/GDP and stock market capitalization, and those between liquid liabilities/GDP and stock market capitalization/GDP are of similar magnitude (0.65 and 0.68), respectively. In our robustness checks, we will also introduce indicators of stock market development, but they have limited impact because of the thinness of African stock markets and their infancy.
density and natural resources. They also include per capita income as an exogenous regressor, claiming that its effect on financial development is contemporaneous while the effect of financial development on income is lagged. The residuals from those regressions, therefore, provide an indication of the extent to which the chosen policies promote financial development.
Our objective differs in that we search for a broader set of variables that have been robustly associated with financial development in countries outside of Africa, especially in low and middle income countries to try to understand what might be different about Africa. We include macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, real growth, and the current account balance; broad measures of institutional development; and variables describing banking sector structure and ownership. We stress from the outset that we are not necessarily estimating causal relationships for the expanded set of regressors. For ease of exposition, however, we refer to all explanatory variables as determinants of financial development throughout the paper.
The regression for the expanded set of explanatory variables is:
( the formal financial system for fear of not being able to get them back quickly enough. We expect therefore the coefficient for inflation to be negative in our regressions.
(c) Current Account Balance: The current account balance can be thought as a rough indicator of the health of the macroeconomic environment, and we thus expect it to be positively associated with our financial indicators.
Institutional Development: We include in the regression KKM, which is the measure of broad institutional development created by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Maztruzzi (2007) .
Institutional development has been found to foster financial development in developing countries (Cull and Effron, 2008) , and thus we expect a positive coefficient for KKM in our regressions.
Banking Sector Concentration:
To control for the structure of the banking sector, we include a measure of banking sector concentration as represented by the share of assets held by the three largest banks in a country. We have no strong prediction about the sign of its coefficient. On the one hand, large dominant banks may foster financial development as they may be better able to exploit economies of scope and scale and thus provide more services than smaller banks. On the other hand, large banks may have a negative impact on financial development as they may use their market power to raise the price of financial services (or lower the interest rate offered for deposits), thus curtailing outreach and the volume of services that they provide.
Bank Ownership:
We measure the impact of bank ownership by including two different variables, the share of banking sector assets held by state-owned and by foreign-owned banks.
(a) State ownership: There is a substantial empirical literature demonstrating that state ownership of banks has negative effects on financial sector outcomes also in terms of real growth and productivity (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002) , and bank portfolio quality and profitability (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2001a, b; 2004) . 7 We would therefore expect a negative coefficient for the share of banking sector assets held by state owned banks in our regressions.
(b) Foreign ownership: Predictions about the foreign bank ownership variable are less firm. On the one hand, foreign banks tend to have lower overhead costs, charge lower spreads, and help promote bank competition by pressuring other banks to lower their costs and their spreads in developing countries (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Claessens and Lee, 2003; Claessens and Laeven, 2003; and Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004) . On the other, foreign banks may extend services to fewer customers, either due to prudence or 'cherry-picking' a small group of wealthy clients (Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta, 2006) .
Manufacturing:
We include the share of GDP generated by the manufacturing sector.
Industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of finance tend to grow faster in countries with well-developed financial sectors (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Manufacturing encompasses a broad variety of activities that tend to rely heavily on external finance so that we expect countries with a large manufacturing sector to have well-developed complementary financial institutions.
We therefore expect a positive coefficient for manufacturing in our regressions.
Secondary/Primary enrolment: Finally, we want to measure the impact of risk management on financial development. The idea is that a lack of capacity in risk management may be a deterrent to banking sector development and broader financial sector development (e.g., stock markets). As measuring financial capabilities across countries directly is not possible, we proxy risk management capability with the ratio of secondary to primary school enrolment and we expect its coefficient to be positive. Our argument is that risk management capability is fundamentally a question of human capital development and thus of talented financial people.
Summary statistics and correlations: The summary statistics and the correlations between variables appear in Tables 3 and 4 . Table 3 shows that the mean values for the financial indicators are uniformly lower in Africa than the rest of the world, measured in terms of liquid liabilities, private credit provision, and stock market development. We also see marked differences in the explanatory variables between Africa and the rest of the world, particularly with respect to population density, per capita income, current account balance/GDP and institutional development as proxied by the KKM index.
The correlations in Table 4 This is indicative that there is a long-run relationship between finance and growth. Finally, the secondary/primary school enrollment is positively associated with the measures of financial development. This proxy is intended to capture the need for increasing talent as the financial system develops.
III. Results: The African Financial Development Gap
What is the positioning of Africa in the financial development path? To measure this, we estimate the regression equation (1) for countries outside Africa to predict what African financial development should be based on the experience of these other countries. Specifically, we first run the regressions excluding all African countries, and we derive out-of-sample predictions for
African financial development. Then we compare these predictions with the actual levels of African financial development to measure the development gap.
The same approach has been used, for example, to assess whether the levels of foreign direct investment received by China are abnormally high, or whether they can be explained by fundamentals (Fan, Morck, Xu, and Yeung, 2008) . We present models for all countries and for low and middle income countries. The latter are more reflective of the African experience.
A. Benchmarking Results for the Determinants of Financial Development
The results for the estimation of the regression equation (1) are presented in Table 5 The expanded regression results, where we include macroeconomic, institutional, banking structure, and other explanatory variables, are presented in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. The results show that Real Growth is negative and significant (or very nearly so) for both private credit and liquid liabilities for both samples of countries that we use. This indicates that the fastest growing countries tend to have the least-developed financial sectors, providing support for conditional convergence. As discussed earlier, this is just a reflection of a short-run 8 These results are qualitatively very similar to those in Beck et al., (2008) . Aside from our proxy for natural resource intensity, our regressions differ from theirs in two ways. First, we use the more conservative cross-sectional approach, whereas they use the full panel. We choose to do this because errors from observations from the same country are likely to be correlated with one another. This could artificially deflate standard errors, thus increasing the significance level of coefficients. For robustness, we ran our models also on the full panel and qualitative results are similar. Second, Beck et al., (2008) include a version of the poverty gap in their regressions, which is the proportion of the population under the poverty line, times the average distance from the poverty line (Source: Povcal Net, World Bank). Since the poverty gap is so tightly linked to income levels, they use the residuals from a regression of the gap on income in their regressions. We did the same, but the variable provided little explanatory power and reduced our sample. Also, unlike the other variables in our analysis, the poverty counts are based on surveys that do not occur at regular intervals, and thus the panel is highly unbalanced. For these reasons, we present models without the poverty gap variable.
relationship between financial development and growth. Inflation is negative and highly significant across financial indicators and country samples. The coefficients are similar in size for the full set of countries and for the low and middle income countries, indicating that macroeconomic instability is strongly linked to financial under-development even in developing countries. The Current Account Balance/GDP is strongly positively linked to both indicators for both samples, though coefficients are larger for the low and middle income sample. In short, the coefficients support our hypotheses and indicate strong links between macroeconomic outcomes and financial development.
Our proxy for the degree of institutional development as represented by the KKM index is positive and highly significant across financial indicators and samples, providing support for the notion that broad institutional development helps to foster financial development. The coefficients are larger for the full-country sample than for the sample of low and middle income countries, but they are still large even in the latter case: a 1-point increase in the KKM index (5-point scale) is associated with a 23 percentage point increase in liquid liabilities/GDP and a 26
percentage point increase for the private credit ratio.
Among the rest of the variables in the expanded regressions, only the Foreign Ownership
Share variables is negatively and almost always robustly associated with both our indicators of banking development, and the link is especially strong in low and middle income countries. At first blush, this result would appear to support the notion that foreign banks tend to cherry-pick a set of elite customers and shun the rural sector in favor of the urban sector. However, it is well known that governments and banking supervisors were looking for foreign investors to recapitalize failed banks during this period. It seems likely, therefore, that much of the increased foreign bank presence occurred in countries with weaker banking systems. Supporting evidence of this can be found in Cull and Martinez Peria (2008) , who find that crisis-induced foreign entry was associated with reduced provision of credit to the private sector, whereas countries with reasonably high and stable levels of foreign bank presence tended to have higher private credit levels before, during, and after crises. As we show below, the foreign ownership variable is not significant for Africa, where systemic crises involving large runs by depositors have been much less frequent than in other parts of the developing world.
The other variable of bank ownership, State Ownership Share, is positively associated with the liquid liabilities to GDP ratio, but not with the private credit ratio, though the result is not significant for either indicator of banking development. The result on the private credit ratio is consistent with the argument that large state ownership of banks makes it possible for the public sector to crowd out the private sector in the credit market and to lower development. The result on the liquid liabilities is instead somewhat counterintuitive. One possible explanation is that the liquid liability measure is more reflective of excessive liquidity in the state-owned banks.
Viewed that way, the liquidity measure becomes a perverse indicator of financial development in a state dominated banking system.
Finally, in the expanded models, natural resource intensity remains negatively related to banking sector development for both indicators, and in particular in the low and middle income sample. Similarly, the offshore financial center variable is significant for both indicators for low and middle income countries. Neither per capita income nor the population density variables remain positive and significant when we use the expanded set of regressors.
To summarize, the factors that are robustly associated with financial development in developing countries outside of Africa are real GDP growth, inflation, the current account balance, broad institutional development, natural resource intensity, the share of banking sector assets held by foreign banks, and the offshore financial center dummy. These results are used as a benchmark in understanding the financial development gap in Africa.
B. Predicted Versus Actual African Financial Development
We now use the regression coefficients in Table 5 to derive a predicted level of financial development for each country in Africa. Because they are likely to be more reflective of the African experience, as our benchmark we rely on the models that include only low and middle income countries. 9 Again, we are not claiming that the relationships we find in Table 5 predicted values are based on linear regressions, they tend to be very near zero for these countries. That their actual levels exceed zero by some small amount is little consolation. To a 9 We also tried to estimate models based only on low income countries outside of Africa, but there were too few observations to generate meaningful results. 10 We suppress the bank ownership variables in deriving the predictions because they are large (in absolute value) and are likely to be driven by selection effects in the case of foreign ownership for the reasons described above. Also, as described below in the text, they are not reflective of the African experience. Including the foreign ownership variable drags predicted levels down near actual levels. It seems farfetched to us, however, to believe that the presence of foreign banks can explain the sizable differences between predicted and actual levels of banking sector development that we summarize in this section. 11 Indeed, for Angola the predicted value is negative (and large in absolute value). This is due to its high average GDP growth (10.6%), low KKM score (-.71), and high inflation (86.4% per year). There are only two countries, namely Cape Verde and Mauritius -among the smallest in Africa -that exceed their predicted levels by a substantial amount, and neither of those small countries is particularly reflective of the African experience. Twenty countries have levels of liquid liabilities that are more than ten points below their predicted levels. As In the next sections, therefore, we look at whether the factors in our base models relate to African financial development differently than to financial development in the rest of the world.
IV. Are the Determinants of African Financial Development Different?
To this point, we have defined under-development in African financial sectors in terms of the determinants of financial sector development in other parts of the developing world.
However, the course of African financial sector development might depend on a different set of factors than those that have been important elsewhere. 12 While we are reluctant to accept that African financial sectors have a distinct model of development, it seems plausible that some factors may be somewhat more or less important in the African context.
As a first step, we estimate the model in Table 5 for the sample of African countries.
Note that this method essentially accepts that the level of financial development in Africa is lower than that in the rest of the developing world, and then tries to explain variation around the African mean based on the explanatory variables in our base models. The results are, however, instructive (Table 6) . First, population density is much more strongly linked to both liquid liabilities/GDP and private credit/GDP than it was elsewhere in the world. In fact, among the set of exogenous factors in the regression equation (1), population density is the only one that is robustly linked to our indicators of banking development. 13 Moreover, the interaction between population and per capita income is positive and significant in two of the private credit regressions, although not when South Africa is dropped from the African sample. This is reasonable, given the relatively high level of economic development of this country. Second, some of the factors that explain financial development in the rest of the developing world are also relevant for Africa. The KKM index of institutional development is significantly associated with the liquid liabilities measure, as it was for the rest of the developing world, but not with the private credit measure.
The additional factors in the expanded regressions (see Table 6 ) are less important in Africa than elsewhere. Real growth is not significant. We argued earlier that the negative, significant coefficient for growth in the rest of the developing world was consistent with conditional convergence, because it indicated that the least financially developed countries had higher growth rates. The non-result for Africa suggests that such convergence did not occur there, a point which was also made for some African countries in Pritchett (1997). In addition,
neither inflation nor the current account balance is significant in the African regressions, whereas 13 The offshore financial center variable does not appear in the models in Table 6 because no African countries qualify as such.
both were highly significant in the rest of the world as shown in Table 5 . The poor results for inflation, the current account, and growth indicate that the macroeconomic fundamentals that are associated with financial development in other developing countries are not important in Africa.
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A. A Closer Look at Differences in Financial Development Factors
The models in Table 6 provide a strong initial indication that the factors associated with banking development in Africa differ from those in the rest of the world. However, those African models are based on only a small number of observations. Moreover, when we include the bank ownership variables in the regressions, our sample drops to only 25 observations, and we cannot derive meaningful results (thus those models do not appear in Table 6 ).
To address the small sample issue we re-run our models for all low and middle income countries (including Africa) and include an interaction between each of our explanatory variables and an Africa dummy variable. We also include an Africa dummy variable on its own to test whether the constant for Africa in our regressions is the same as in the rest of the developing world. This is akin to a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), but the coefficients on the interactions terms enable us to make more precise statements about whether the effects for Africa are statistically different than for the rest of the developing world and from zero (i.e., there is no effect).
The results are presented in Table 7 . In the simplest regressions, we include only the Africa dummy and the limited set of regressors.. The Africa dummy is negative for both indicators but it is significant only in the liquid liabilities regression. Per capita income is positive and significant for both indicators (columns 1 and 5). It remains positive when the Africa interactions are introduced (columns 2 and 6), but is now insignificant for the liquid liabilities regression. However, per capita income is mostly not significant when we introduce the African interaction terms for the expanded set of regressors (columns 3, 4, and 8). The offshore financial center variable is positive and significant across all specifications in Table 7 , though again no African country qualifies as an offshore center and so there is no Africa interaction for the variable.
The most relevant explanatory variable for Africa is again population density. When only the limited set of regressors is included in the regression, population density is positive and highly significant. When the Africa dummy is interacted with those variables (columns 2 and 6), the relationship is still positive but weaker in terms of significance. When interactions are included for the expanded set of regressors (columns 3, 4, 7, and 8), the variable is no longer positive and significant. However, the interaction between population density and the Africa dummy is significant for both of our indicators of banking development when the bank ownership variables are excluded from the regressions (columns 3 and 7).
We also reject that the sum of the coefficients for density and its interaction with the Africa dummy is zero at the p=0.05 level for those models (see F-statistics near the bottom of Table 7 ). In other words, the relationship between population density and our banking development indicators for African countries is significantly different from zero.
When the bank ownership variables are introduced, the coefficient for Africa*population density is positive and remains similar in size for both indicators, but does not quite achieve significance, and we cannot reject that the sum of density and its Africa interaction is zero. We are not very concerned about this, as foreign banks do not enter markets randomly and are, in fact, attracted to densely populated areas. The correlation between foreign ownership and density is 0.43 which is significant at the p=0.01 level. It is no surprise, therefore, that those variables compete for explanatory power in the regression. Density clearly preceded and led to the presence of foreign-owned banks, not the other way around. Therefore, we are on firm ground in interpreting our regressions in Table 7 to imply that there is a strong relationship between population density and banking indicators for Africa, but not for the rest of the world.
In contrast, the relationship between natural resource intensity and banking indicators is about the same in Africa as it is in the rest of the developing world. The coefficient for our proxy of natural resource intensity is negative and tends to be highly significant in our models with the expanded set of regressors and Africa interactions. The coefficient for its interaction with the Africa dummy is never significant, and thus we reject the hypothesis that the relationship between natural resources and banking development is somehow different for Africa. The relatively low levels of banking development cannot, therefore, be attributable to the curse of natural resources being more severe in Africa than in other parts of the developing world.
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Concerning the regressors that are only included in the expanded set, the coefficient for real growth is negative and highly significant across all specifications for both indicators of 15 When the bank ownership variables are included in the model the negative coefficients for the interaction between Africa and natural resource intensity, though not significant, become much larger (in absolute value). While this is suggestive of the resource curse being more severe in Africa, there is interplay between the natural resources variable and the foreign bank ownership variable that renders that conclusion dubious. Foreign owners are attracted to resource-rich countries and thus there is a positive correlation between foreign bank ownership and our proxy for resource intensity (0.21, p-value 0.06). It is not therefore surprising that the inclusion of the foreign ownership variable has an effect on the coefficient for the endowment variable. In any event, the standard errors on its interaction with the Africa dummy are so large that the coefficient is telling us very little.
financial development. The coefficient for the Africa*growth interaction is positive and insignificant in the models without the ownership variables (columns 3 and 7). However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of the two coefficients (growth and Africa*growth) is zero. 16 The same is true for the models with the ownership variables (columns 4 and 8), even though the Africa*growth coefficients are negative (see F-statistics near the bottom of Table 7 ).
This indicates that the conditional convergence result does not hold in Africa, as was suggested by our simple comparison of the coefficients from the base model (Table 5 ) with those from the African models (Table 6 ).
Similar results hold for the inflation variable which remains negative and highly significant when the interactions are included in the regressions. The interaction between inflation and the Africa dummy is positive, significant, and of a magnitude similar to that of the simple inflation variable. We cannot, therefore, reject the hypothesis that the sum of the inflation and Africa*inflation variables is zero, which indicates that, like real growth, inflation has not been associated with less financial development in Africa, as it has in the rest of the world.
A similar pattern also holds for the current account balance, which is positive and highly significant across specifications. Its interaction with the Africa dummy variable is negative in all specifications and significant in most. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of the two coefficients is equal to zero, that is, that the current account balance has no effect on African banking development. The regressions that include interaction terms therefore indicate that the high predicted levels of financial development for Africa from our base models derive, in part, from macroeconomic factors that matter only outside Africa.
The pattern for the KKM index of institutional development is a bit different than that for the macroeconomic variables. Its coefficient is positive and significant in all specifications indicating it has been associated with banking development outside of Africa. Its interaction with the Africa dummy variable is insignificant for the liquid liabilities regression, and thus we cannot reject the hypothesis that the relationship found elsewhere applies also to Africa. For the private credit regression, however, the interaction term is negative and significant, indicating that any such relationship does not hold for Africa. Moreover, summing the coefficient for KKM and its interaction with Africa, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no relationship between institutional development and banking development in Africa for either indicator (see F-statistics near the bottom of Table 7 ). In short, the positive relationship between the KKM index and banking development is weaker in Africa than in other developing countries, and what
relationship there is appears to apply only to the liabilities side of bank balance sheets rather than to the provision of credit.
B. Toward Resolving the African Finance Puzzle
Are the determinants of financial development different in Africa? The more refined analysis indicates that the determinants of banking development in Africa differ from the rest of the world in a significant way. The difference arises even when Africa is benchmarked against other low income countries. Of particular interest is the set of factors that matter outside Africa but not in Africa, and those that matter in Africa but not in the rest of the world.
Let us focus on just a few of these factors. While macroeconomic variables are important determinants of banking development in the rest of the world, they surprisingly lose power in the context of Africa. Even an index of institutional development, as represented by the KKM index, shows up weak, particularly in the private credit dimension of banking development. We also observe that the notion of a natural resource curse, which is largely popularized in the context of a country rich in resources like Africa, is insignificant in explaining the African financial development gap. The one explanatory variable that stands out for Africa is population density. Our results show a relationship between population density and banking indicators for Africa, but not for the rest of the world.
In general, the differences between the predicted and actual values of financial development for Africa become smaller when the interaction terms are included in the regressions. In fact, the average difference for the models with full interactions is very close to zero. No difference is greater than 0.06 or less than -0.06 for either indicator of banking development. The majority of the predicted values lie within two percentage points of their actual levels. The simple Africa dummy, which is really a measure of our ignorance about what drives African financial development, is no longer significant.
Our findings suggest that were holding down inflation, generating a current account surplus, and conditional convergence to work in Africa as elsewhere, the levels of financial development would be higher. At the same time, we are at a loss to explain why those mechanisms do not seem to work in Africa, or what policies might help to jump-start the relationship between macroeconomic fundamentals and financial development. Perhaps a period of sustained economic growth will ignite those mechanisms, but the African puzzle continues in a different form.
17 17 Another possibility is that variables that are very important for African financial development are omitted from our models. We experimented with two types of variables: fractionalization and armed conflict. Our fractionalization data are from Alesina et al. (2003) . Easterly and Levine (1997) demonstrate that ethnic fractionalization explains a large share of factors that are linked to (slow) growth within Africa. We use the UCDP/PRIO dataset to calculate the average number of armed conflicts per year for each country. Neither the fractionalization nor the armed conflict variables are significant in our banking development regressions, and their inclusion does not alter the main qualitative results of our models.
C. Robustness
We now perform additional tests and robustness checks. Of particular interest are the role of population density which shows up so strongly in Africa and foreign bank ownership which has at best mixed effect. Moreover, we have focused on the banking sector in studying African financial development, but there has been a proliferation of stock exchanges in Africa over the recent past. African countries seem committed to the equity sector in promoting financial development, and it would be useful to examine if a similar financial development gap arises in the context of stock markets although they remain small and illiquid.
Population density:
We try to better understand why sparsely populated African countries have low levels of banking development by including additional variables in our regressions. The aim is to get a sense of what policy responses may be promising.
It is likely that financial service providers do not find African areas attractive, given the limited economies of scale available, but it could also be that there is little demand for financial services in such areas. To capture this, we include measures of bank branch penetration for each country (measured per capita and per sq. km) and measures of transportation infrastructure (roads and railroads per sq. km) to see whether physical isolation underlies our density results. Finally, we include general measures of urbanization. The results are presented in Table 8 .
Except for the urbanization variables, the inclusion of these variables substantially reduces our sample, especially among African countries, and we cannot obtain meaningful results. We reluctantly conclude that cross-country regressions are not a good tool for uncovering why population density turns out to be more important for African banking development than elsewhere. Separating demand from supply-side factors will likely require detailed surveys of African residents. Within those surveys, it is possible to embed randomized evaluations of interventions to improve financial literacy or to promote use of technologies, such as mobile banking that may yield useful insights about how best to promote access to and use of financial services in Africa.
Bank foreign ownership:
The foreign ownership variable has negative and highly significant coefficient, while its interaction with the Africa dummy produces a positive coefficient that is significant and somewhat larger (in absolute value). Summing those coefficients up, the net relationship between foreign ownership and our banking indicators for African countries is positive, though we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no relationship (i.e., that the coefficient for Africa is zero). Still, whatever negative relationship there is between foreign ownership and banking development in the rest of the world, it does not seem to apply to Africa.
While the share of banking sector assets controlled by foreign banks is perhaps the most obvious ownership measure to include in our regressions, non-random selection is a major concern, and its inclusion does affect other coefficients such as population density and natural resource intensity. What we need is a variable that describes ownership patterns but is less endogenous to the process of financial development. We therefore use the Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2008) indexes of limitations on foreign bank entry and ownership and of general requirements to enter into banking, reasoning that those restrictions provide an indication of a country's predilections toward outside investment in its financial sector. Such predilections can be easily overturned, as in times of financial crisis, and many countries, in fact, have a high degree of foreign ownership of the banking sector and restrictive rules on foreign entry. We therefore think that the restrictions on entry and ownership are more plausibly exogenous, though we admit that these too are far from perfect.
Similarly to Barth et al. (2008) , we find a negative coefficient for the index of foreign entry limitations when we include these indexes in the regressions in Table 7 , or when we replace the state and foreign ownership variables with them, though the coefficient is not always significant. The result suggests that countries with a predilection to restrict foreign presence are likely to have less banking development than others. More importantly, when we replace the ownership variables with the restrictions on entry, the results for the population density variable are qualitatively very similar to those for regressions that do not include the ownership variables (columns 3 and 7, Table 7 ). For that reason, we do not present the results using the indexes of restrictions in the paper. The results from those regressions do, however, support the notion that the relationship between population density and banking sector development is important in Africa, but not elsewhere.
Stock market development:
As a final empirical exercise, we replace our indicators of banking development with indicators of stock market development, namely stock market capitalization and the value of traded shares, each divided by GDP, and re-run the models in Table 7 . These are yearly observations that we average over the sample period for each country as described above. We are unable to run our base models from Table 6 on the sample of African countries because so few of them have indicators of stock market development. The results from the full interaction models in Table 9 are notable only because none of the variables that are associated with stock market development in the rest of the developing world are important in Africa. That is, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the relationship between any of the variables in our models and our indicators of African stock market development is zero (see F-statistics at the bottom of Table 9 ). Once these stock markets are better established, it might be easier to analyze the determinants of their development via cross-country regressions, but we are not yet at that point.
V. Conclusions
The available evidence provides a convincing linkage between financial development and economic development. elsewhere. This suggests that technological advances, such as mobile banking that enable users of financial services to be located far away from their financial institutions, could be a promising way to facilitate African financial development.
An index of institutional development is linked to African banking development, but less strongly than in the rest of the developing world. In particular, broad institutional development as reflected in the KKM index is positively linked to the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP in Africa as elsewhere, but not to the ratio of private credit to GDP. General improvement in institutions might therefore help increase the level of deposits in the banking system, though it is not clear that those deposits would be intermediated well to the private sector based on Africa's past experience.
Other factors that are strongly linked to financial development in other countries are not linked to African financial development. There is no evidence of conditional convergence for Africa (i.e., less financially-developed countries growing faster). Inflation and the current account balance explain no variation in African financial development though they do in other developing countries. Why this collection of macroeconomic fundamentals is not linked to
African financial development is difficult to explain. However, were countries to adopt policies that would enable these macroeconomic mechanisms to function, our results suggest that their levels of financial development would rise.
When we allow our explanatory variables to have different associations with banking development in Africa than in other developing countries, predicted and actual levels of African financial development become much closer, and the simple Africa dummy variable becomes insignificant. This again suggests that the African financial development gap is attributable to differences in the underlying factors for banking development from the rest of the world, including, surprisingly, low income non-African countries. . Thus, while the level of financial development in Africa is low, and hence disappointing, remedying that situation may require different measures from those that have worked elsewhere. 80.0% 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 50.0% 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 Table 5 , Column 8, without the bank ownership variable; negative predicted values are replaced by zero).
